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Abstract
This paper argues that wives in developing countries use domestic labour as a tool
to incentivise husbands, especially when they lack power and cannot credibly threaten
divorce. In Malawi, husbands often supplement farm income with wage labour. In our
model, this creates moral hazard: husbands may not make su¢ cient e¤ort to bring home
wages. Wives use di¤erent tools to incentivise husbands. They either threaten them with
divorce or alter their domestic labour. Our theory predicts that wives who would be hurt
badly by divorce resort to using domestic labour as a source of power. Others, having
better "outside options", use a combination of the two or only divorce threat. We conrm
this prediction using survey data from Malawi. Identication is based on the fact that
Malawis kinship traditions exogenously determine outside options. Wives in patrilineal
cultures (with low outside options) react to good consumption outcomes by signicantly
increasing domestic labour and reducing leisure, whereas matrilineal wives do not. The
e¤ect is particularly strong for patrilineal wives with no natal land inheritance. This
suggests that land inheritance is a crucial determinant of the accessibility of divorce to
women in Malawi.
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Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power:
Theory and Evidence from Malawi
1 Introduction
In developing countries, women continue to specialise in domestic production in households.
This specialisation has traditionally been considered a burden for women, primarily because
it reduces their earnings power, which is argued to reduce their power within marriage.
The question we address in this paper is whether women use their monopoly in domestic
production as leverage to inuence their husbandsactions in their favour, and if so, whether
its usage depends on the presence of another source of empowerment, namely easy and fair
divorce. We structure our model on the family institutions of Malawi, where exogenous
kinship traditions imply that wives can divorce easily in some areas but not others. A
theoretical model of moral hazard in marriage is derived, which predicts that women with
low outside options are more likely to increase their domestic labour in response to a good
consumption outcome compared to women with high outside options. This prediction is
conrmed in the data.
Marriage is a type of contract, with each spouse having expectations of a set of services
that their partner will provide them with in the future (Cohen, 1987). There is an inherent
lack of full information in marriage, as a result of which the e¤ort or time spent generating
marital goods, such as joint earnings, may be unobservable. A wife may not know whether
her husbands low salary is due to lack of e¤ort or poor luck; the husband may have an
incentive to be lazy because he has to share the benets of his labour. This suggests there
is a moral hazard problem in marriage. This problem is exacerbated in developing countries,
where womens low autonomy results in less inuence within marriage. Divorce may be an
empowering strategy (Cohen 1971, Reniers 2003). The threat of divorce forces husbands to
involve their wives in decisions and to provide for them. However, divorce can be inaccessible
to women if it strips them of their marital assets and social standing. If divorce is not a
credible threat, a fundamental moral hazard problem in marriage remains.
We hypothesise that wives address this problem by using domestic production as an in-
centive device. England and Folbre (2002) emphasise the role that marriage-specic resources
such as household work and a¤ection can play as sources of bargaining power, if they can be
credibly withheld. In cultures where men have o¢ cial authority over women, these sources
of power are particularly important as women may hold "unassigned" power through the
ability to withhold food and sexual services (Lamphere 1974, p. 99). This o¢ cial authority
is particularly emphasised in patrilineal, polygamous societies: Cohens (1971) study of the
Kanuri in Bornu demonstrated that control of the household sphere was the main way in
which women derived control in other spheres of marital life. The key to the e¤ectiveness
of this mechanism is specialisation, which implies that a womans labour cannot be easily
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replaced.
Kinship is a further important factor a¤ecting womens position in developing countries
because it often assigns authority and inuences attitudes to gender. It a¤ects the extent to
which divorce is accessible to women, which in turn determines a womans dependence on
leverage devices such as domestic production.
In this paper, we model marriage in rural Malawi, where there are two distinct kinship
traditions. Kinship is determined by birth and is thus exogenous, which allows us to neatly
compare the e¤ect that di¤erent kinship rules have on behaviour. Most of Malawi is ma-
trilineal: inheritance passes through the mothers line and matrilocality is common, where
a married couple reside in the wifes natal village. The remainder of Malawi is patrilineal,
where inheritance moves from father to son and patrilocality is common. Under matriliny,
womens outside options are high because they own land and have the support of their kin.
As a result, divorce is a credible threat. In contrast, divorce is not a credible threat un-
der patriliny where a woman who divorces is left with no assets. We expect more use of a
within-marriage source of power, domestic labour, by patrilineal than matrilineal wives.
Existing intra-household models are inadequate for developing country households in sev-
eral ways. First, bargaining and cooperative intra-household models (Manser and Brown
1980, Chiappori 1988) postulate that a womans power within marriage is solely determined
by her outside option. This does not provide an adequate explanation of how women with
otherwise low autonomy are able to exert control within the household. For example, Ashraf
(2009) demonstrates that women often rely on communication to elicit desirable outcomes
within marriage. Second, Whitehead (1985) argues that existing unilateral models of the
household (Becker 1973, 1974) are inappropriate for developing country households because
they ignore underlying cultural institutions. We hope to remedy these two criticisms by
explicitly including a within-marriage source of power and kinship in our model.
We propose a model in which wives use a combination of domestic production and divorce
threat to incentivise husbands because of a moral hazard problem. Wives observe the amount
of cash a husband brings home, which is a noisy signal of how much e¤ort he has made to
contribute to the household. They respond positively to a high amount and negatively
otherwise. The model is tested on wives time use in Malawi; the results show the use of
domestic production incentives in marriages where wives have low outside options: patrilineal
marriages and, in particular, those marriages where the wife has no inherited land from her
natal kin.
Our model includes asymmetric information, explicit incentives and domestic production.
Most of the current marriage economics literature focuses on Pareto e¢ cient outcomes (Chi-
appori 1988, Lundberg and Pollak 1993), which are not supported by data on productive
activities (Udry 1996). This motivates asymmetric information in marriage in our model,
which has already received some attention in the literature (Peters 1986, Friedberg and Stern
2010). The use of incentive mechanisms in marriage is understudied, however; one exception
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is Landes (1978), who models the role of alimony as an enforcement mechanism for optimal
marital investment. Domestic production as a source of power has been addressed by Pollak
(2005) through its e¤ect on the outside option rather than its use as a leverage device.
There have been several empirical studies on female empowerment in developing countries
(e.g. Anderson and Eswaran 2009); however, this is to the authors best knowledge the rst
paper to show empirically the use of domestic production as an active incentive device.
Related to the present paper, Reniers (2003) shows that divorce can be an empowering
strategy in Malawi while Alfano et al (2011) observe that household-level sources of power
are more important for women living in Indian states with low rather than high institutional
female autonomy.
This paper o¤ers important policy implications relating to female empowerment. Domes-
tic specialisation can be empowering for women, especially when their autonomy is otherwise
low. Accessible divorce is also empowering and may reduce the need for sources of power
internal to marriage. However, there is a trade-o¤. The data shows that households in those
regions of Malawi where divorce is accessible are poorer. This suggests that this empower-
ment comes at a price: the inability of women to commit not to divorce husbands may result
in reduced incentives to generate household wealth. This is because the husband does not
retain marital assets upon divorce, which introduces uncertainty in land tenure (Place and
Otsuka 2001).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section gives some back-
ground on Malawi relevant to the paper. The theoretical model of marriage is presented in
Section 3. The empirical analysis is in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Context: Women in Malawi
2.1 An Overview of Malawi
Malawi is a land-locked country in sub-Saharan Africa with a population of close to 15 million
in 2010, 80% of which resided in rural areas.1 It is a low income country; GDP per capita at
constant prices was $184 and it ranked 153rd out of 169 countries measured in the Human
Development Index in 2010. Life expectancy at birth measured 53 years in 2009. Around
90% of all employees work in the agricultural sector (Bignami-Van Assche et al 2011). Most
of these are involved in smallholder production with land plots under 3 hectares (Ellis et
al 2003). Due to the importance of agriculture for most of the Malawi population, labour
is a key asset for household production (Phiri 1984). Most households combine farming,
waged labour and small business to earn their livelihoods (Kerr 2005a). HIV/AIDS is a large
problem in Malawi, with 11% of the adult population infected in 2009.
1All data is from the World Bank databank (http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi) unless stated
otherwise.
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The empowerment of women in Malawi is low: the pervasiveness of early marriage, forced
marriage, polygyny and societal attitudes putting the man at the head of the family frequently
make women subject to domestic abuse, in both its physical and psychological forms (Malawi
Human Rights Commission 2006).
2.2 Agricultural Production in Malawi
2.2.1 The agricultural year
The agricultural year in Malawi begins in October with the rainy season. The rainy season
lasts roughly from October until March, during which period maize is grown as the primary
subsistence crop (Takane 2008, Ellis et al). The dry season lasts from April until September.
During the dry season, households consume the maize they have grown and engage in other,
primarily non-agricultural, income-earning opportunities (Kerr 2005b).
Short-term, o¤-farm labour opportunities are usually termed ganyu. Most households are
unable to grow enough food to last them until the end of the next rainy season, when their
stock of maize will be repleted (Kerr 2005b). Ganyu in the rainy season or seasonal ganyu
occurs when households run out of food. This type of ganyu can be paid for in cash or kind,
but is usually paid for with maize. Both women and men engage in seasonal ganyu. Ganyu in
the dry season usually involves short-term tasks such as brick-making or vegetable gardening
(Kerr 2005b). These are not in conict with own-farm agricultural production and are not
normally an indicator of food insecurity. Instead, they are used to bring additional income
to the household, which can be used to purchase fertiliser and other farm inputs for the next
rainy season, for example (Kerr 2005a, 2005b).
The data used in the study is for the 2003-2004 and 2005-2006 agricultural seasons, with
interviews taking place during the dry season. Agricultural production in these two seasons
was normal (Takane 2008, Denning et al 2009).
2.2.2 Division of labour
The division of labour in Malawi is strongly regimented by culture and tradition. The primary
use of householdslabour is for subsistence production. The predominant crop grown is maize,
although some households grow cassava and rice as food sources (Spring 1995). The labour
for maize is either shared or predominantly carried out by women (Spring 1995, Kerr 2005a,
Hirschmann and Vaughan 1983). The wife is usually responsible for harvesting, storage and
seed selection. Men, in contrast, share the labour in land preparation, weeding, planting and
the application of fertiliser. Good health is particularly important for the ability to carry out
agricultural labour (Engberg et al 1987).
Women are responsible for the domestic sphere of the household. Spring (1995) documents
that women spend an equal number of hours on the farm and in domestic activities, nishing
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their domestic tasks before or after farm work. Activities include childcare, cooking, cleaning
and fetching water and rewood. A comparison of men and women shows that men spent
much less time on domestic labour (around a third or quarter of the wifes number of hours).
In addition, their domestic activity appears to primarily consist of house building and repair.
Many men interviewed by Kerr (2005a) admitted this unequal gender labour divide, which
is testimony to the way it is culturally entrenched.
Men are responsible for generating cash income for non-food necessities. Bignami-Van
Assche et al (2011) note that men are mainly responsible for generating income to purchase
items not produced by the household such as clothing, salt and soap. This takes place during
the dry season (Spring 1995, Bignami-Van Assche et al 2011). Women carry out a substantial
amount of waged income only when they are unmarried or their husbands do not contribute
to the household. The husbands cash-generating labour is o¤-farm and thus unobservable
from the wifes perspective.
Husbands have more leisure time than their wives, particularly in the dry season when
o¤-farm income earning is not immediately necessary for the survival of the household (Kerr
2005a). Wivesdomestic duties continue throughout the dry season, so that wives have to
rise earlier than husbands to tend to domestic chores (Kerr 2005a). On the whole, Kerr
(2005a) nds that most of the wivestasks are year-round whereas the only tasks that were
to any extent year-round for the husband are ganyu, going to the market and ironing. These
observations suggest that during the dry season, husbands have the capacity to work more
hours than they do on average but choose not to. Indeed, wives in Kerrs (2005a) study
frequently talked about low labour contributions of husbands towards own-farm or o¤-farm
production. This suggests that husbands´ cost of e¤ort is high.
2.2.3 Cash income
The cash income that husbands earn for o¤-farm labour has become crucial for households. In
addition to clothes and other consumption goods, wages are often used to purchase fertiliser
and other farm inputs (Kerr 2005a). Cash needs to come from o¤-farm labour because
households are usually unable to produce enough crop to meet both subsistence and sales
needs. Hirschmann and Vaughan (1983) note that the most prosperous households in their
study were those with su¢ cient land for food production but also with substantial income
from husbands working for wages. Spring (1995) also notes that households are becoming
increasingly reliant on husbands bringing in income from outside opportunities.
Husbandsearnings are uncertain from the perspective of wives. This may be because
employers renegotiate agreed wages in the face of agricultural shocks such as low yields
(Takane 2008) or because wives do not know the earnings of the husband, giving husbands
scope to conceal the true amount. In 42% of households studied by Kerr (2005a), wives
did not know their husbands income. Often, husbands would not contribute their cash and
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would instead spend it on consumption goods such as alcohol, which was a growing problem
in the region. There is a moral hazard problem: because husbandscash-generating labour
is unobservable to wives and husbands have to share their income, they have an incentive to
put in less than the optimal level of e¤ort from the perspective of the household.
2.3 Intra-Household Relations
2.3.1 Kinship: Patriliny and matriliny in Malawi
A crucial factor that a¤ects the rules by which household members in Malawi act is kinship.
This is determined by the tribe a person is born into and is thus exogenous to any behavioural
decisions. Tribes are either patrilineal or matrilineal. The distinction is a function of many
intricate rules that govern marriage, residence, custody over children and inheritance (Kerr
2005a). Traditionally, matrilineal systems of descent involve inheritance through the mothers
side and the mother gains custody of children as well as assets in divorce. Matrilocality is
common, where the husband moves to the wifes village after marriage. Matrilocality implies
that a husband is removed from his primary source of power: his kin (Reniers 2003). Should
the couple divorce, the husband leaves the wifes village with nothing: local narratives say
that the man "leaves with [nothing but] his blanket" (Reniers 2003, p. 180). This puts a
matrilocal husband in a very uncertain position.
Patrilineal systems are based on descent through the fathers side and patrilocality is
common, where the wife moves to the husbands village after marriage. The possible loss
of child custody for the wife following a patrilineal divorce presents an emotional cost as
well as the possible removal of old-age support (Reniers 2003). However, the rules of each
kinship system are not always strictly upheld. Matrilineal couples may end up settling down
patrilocally. It is less common for patrilineal couples to reside matrilocally. A wife may
stand to inherit from her natal kin, regardless of her kinship. Generally, however, patrilineal
couples are more likely to marry patrilocally and the wife is less likely to inherit land from
her natal kin. The opposite is true for matrilineal couples.
Under patriliny, wivesoutside options are low. As a result, the incentives to divorce are
limited. The desperation of wives in the patrilineal regions of Malawi to assume any kind
of control within marriage is well-documented by Kerr (2005a). The wives interviewed often
claimed husbands were "harsh" and not ready to share more of their cash income with the
household. Although the cash income was inadequate, they felt that they had no power to
change the situation. Sometimes the husbands also took wivescash income from the sale
of crops. Excessive usage of alcohol was also observed in the community studied by Kerr
(2005a), which a¤ected the ability of husbands to provide labour and was a cost on scarce
resources. Alcohol was the most frequently cited cause for marital conict. The case of one
husband is documented, whose wife stopped cooking for him due to his excessive drinking;
this is an example of the type of behaviour we are exploring in this paper.
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In contrast, women in matrilineal families in southern and central Malawi have high
outside options, as a result of which husbands are often more supportive. Salios-Rothschild
(1982) describes the strong kinship support o¤ered to women in matrilineal communities,
which leads to strong female autonomy, frequently accompanied by a lack of marital stability.
Anthropologists acknowledge that marital ties are weaker in matrilineal societies (Peters
1997), potentially because the bond between a matrilineal sister and her brother is stronger
and more loyal than the bond between the sister and her husband. Indeed, district-level
divorce rates were 7% in matrilineal communities in 2011 compared to 5% in patrilineal
communities (Telalagi´c 2012). Husbands need to work hard to avoid divorce: while the
matrilineal husband is seen by his wifes kin as a "work-horse," he may gain the respect of
the family and community if he is hard-working (Phiri 1983, p. 260). Since divorced women
lose any cash support from their husbands, they will only divorce if this support is inadequate.
There are nine main ethnic divisions or tribes (Spring 1995). The matrilineal tribes are
the Chewa, Nyanja, Manganja, Lomwe, Tonga and Yao. The patrilineal tribes include the
Ngonde, Ngoni, and Tumbuka. In addition, the less common Senga and Sena are patrilineal.
3 Model of Moral Hazard in Marriage
We model marriage in Malawi as a sequential investment game, where the husband and wife
take turns in generating a marital good. The husband generates cash, which is synonymous
with a rivalrous consumption good, while the wife produces a domestic good. In a general
model of marriage, this would be repeated an indenite number of times. However, we focus
on the specic two-period interaction. We consider the role that domestic production may
play as an incentive device, as well as the role of divorce threat. We show that the use of
domestic production is more likely when the wifes outside option is low. We derive two
solutions to the model: one where the wife relies on divorce threat in addition to domestic
production and another where only domestic production is used because divorce is not desir-
able or accessible. These represent a matrilineal and patrilineal marriage respectively. Since
the choice between the two mechanisms is primarily a function of the outside option repre-
sented by divorce, the optimal choice of mechanism may also be a¤ected by marital residence
and whether the wife has inherited any land from her natal kin. In the empirical section we
explore the e¤ect of these two additional channels on the usage of domestic production as
leverage.
There are two periods, t = 1; 2. Each spouse is given a xed amount of time that they
allocate between labour and leisure. They move sequentially. In the rst period, the husband
works and generates income that is used to purchase a consumption good; the consumption
good is shared between the two spouses according to an exogenous sharing rule. We assume
that all of the husbands income is spent on the consumption good so that we can measure his
contribution in terms of the amount of consumption good provided. The good can be clothing,
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for example, or inputs needed for farming, both of which are purchased with husbands cash
income in Malawi. In the second period, the wife supplies labour towards the provision of a
domestic, public good. This labour includes tasks such as cleaning and cooking. Note that
we exclude childcare and other domestic activities that may not be credibly withheld, such
as fetching water. Following the wifes domestic production, the couple remain married or
divorce. This is decided by the wife and determines a continuation payo¤ in addition to the
payo¤s derived from the stage game. Both domestic production and whether to divorce are
determined optimally by the wife at the beginning of the marriage, prior to the realisation
of any e¤orts or outcomes. The power to divorce is assumed to lie only with the wife; this
is because we are focusing on the sources of power that a woman may rely on. Allowing
husbands to divorce would not add signicant insight into the wifes decision, since the wifes
optimal mechanism always ensures the husband prefers to remain married.
In the rst period the husbands e¤ort (amount of time allocated to economic labour)
is not observable. This is justied by the fact that it is o¤-farm labour. For simplicity we
assume that the husband has two e¤ort choices: low (eL) and high (eH). Provision of the
consumption good is stochastic: it can either be good (CG) or bad (CB). This realisation
can be inuenced by the husbands e¤ort with the following probabilities:
pr(CGjeH) = q;
pr(CGjeL) = p;
where q > p. The husband can improve the chances of realising a good level of the
consumption good by putting in high e¤ort.
In the second period the wife chooses an e¤ort level conditional on the outcome she
observes: l = lGjC = CG; l = lBjC = CB; l 2 [0; T ], where T is her available time, net of farm
labour. The production function of the public good is z(l). After she produces the domestic
good, the couple may divorce. We assume that following a good outcome, the wife always
wishes to remain married. Following a bad outcome, she may want to divorce. Both domestic
labour and the marriage/divorce decision are chosen strategically to ensure the husband puts
in the high level of e¤ort.
The incentives are not simple. By reducing her e¤ort, the wife punishes herself by reducing
her own consumption of the public good. As a result, she may produce less of the public
good than she would like to. We expect to observe situations where her marginal utility of
labour supply is positive: she would like to work more but is prevented by the incentives of
the contract. This is di¤erent to standard moral hazard models (Arrow 1970), where the
principals utility is strictly decreasing in his payment to the agent. In addition, the use of
divorce threat can be detrimental to the wife because her continuation payo¤ under divorce
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may be low. As a result, she may not always want to rely on divorce to generate incentives.
Note that we abstract away the issue of own-farm agricultural labour; we assume this is
xed and determined outside the model. The couple decide how to allocate the remainder
of their time. Own-farm labour is assumed to be observable because both spouses engage in
agricultural labour and have access to the households plot of land. Weather shocks may occur
but are observable to both spouses. Further, agricultural labour involves a xed set of tasks
that need to be performed each year; if they are not performed, insu¢ cient food is produced
and the household may starve. As a result, it seems plausible that individual preferences
with regard to leisure will not be factored into the labour required for agriculture. We will
verify empirically that agricultural labour decisions are made independently of outcomes.
Utility in the stage game is simply the sum of utility in each period, with no discounting.
The wifes von-Neumann Morgenstern utility consists of her benet from the consumption
and public goods under outcome k, (Ck; z(lk)) = uk; k = G;B less her cost of e¤ort (lk) =
 k. The husbands benet under outcome k is $(Ck; z(lk)) = vk and his cost of e¤ort is
 (ej) = 	j ; j = H;L. The husbands pre-marital utility, namely if he did not marry in the
rst place, is denoted by V with a specic level V^ . Lifetime utility is the sum of utility in
the stage game and a continuation payo¤ that represents the expected utility from remaining
married or being divorced. If the wife decides to remain married following a bad outcome, the
respective continuation payo¤s of the husband and wife are VM and UM . If the wife decides
to divorce following a bad outcome, the continuation payo¤s are V D and UD. We assume
that UM > UD and VM > V D: all other things equal, both spouses prefer to remain married
rather than divorce. This is a reasonable assumption, as otherwise at least one spouse would
always wish to dissolve the marriage.
3.1 The General Solution
In this section we derive the general solution. The wife maximises her expected utility condi-
tional on high e¤ort by the husband, subject to the incentive and participation constraints.
This maximisation is carried out with respect to the two levels of domestic labour, lG and lB,
that she will supply if she observes CG or CB respectively. In addition, she decides whether
to remain married or divorce following a bad outcome. The wife solves the following program:
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max
lG;lB ;U;V 
q((CG; z(lG))  (lG) + UM ) + (1  q)((CB; z(lB))  (lB) + U)
s:t: :
(q   p)($(CG; z(lG)) + VM  $(CB; z(lB))  V )   (eH)   (eL);
q($(CG; z(lG)) + VM ) + (1  q)($(CB; z(lB)) + V )   (eH)  V^ ;
U 2 fUM ; UDg;
V  2 fVM ; V Dg:
We solve the problem in two stages. First, we nd the optimal labour supplies in two
cases: one where U = UM , which we denote the domestic production mechanism and one
where U = UD, which we denote the divorce threat mechanism. Second, we analyse the
optimal choice of U, which is determined by the wifes expected utility from the consumption
and public goods as well as her utility in the divorce state.
3.1.1 The domestic production mechanism
In the domestic production mechanism, U = UM and consequently V  = VM . The solution
is derived in Appendix A; the most important results are detailed here. The two rst order
conditions with respect to the wifes domestic labour levels can be rewritten as
@(CG; z(lG))
@z(lG)
@z(lG)
@lG
  @(l
G)
@lG
= ( (q   p)
q
  )@$(C
G; z(lG))
@z(lG)
@z(lG)
@lG
;
@(CB; z(lB))
@z(lB)
@z(lB)
@lB
  @(l
B)
@lB
= (
(q   p)
(1  q)   )
@$(CB; z(lB))
@z(lB)
@z(lB)
@lB
:
In order to make predictions about lG and lB, we need to ascertain whether the con-
straints bind. In order to check the Kuhn-Tucker conditions determining whether the con-
straints are binding, we can solve the rst-order conditions simultaneously for  = (lG; lB)
and  = (lG; lB) (see Appendix A). These two equations in combination with the two
inequality constraints and four Kuhn-Tucker conditions on  and  give us four equations
and four inequalities, whose simultaneous solution determines four quantities: lG; lB; ; .
The solution takes one of four possible cases. The cases represent the di¤erent permutations
of which, if any, of the two inequality constraints bind. For the constraints to be binding,
the multipliers must be positive at lG = lG; lB = lB.
We would expect the participation constraint to bind when the husbands outside option
is high. The incentive constraint is expected to bind when the di¤erence between the costs of
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high and low e¤ort is large or when the probability of the good outcome under high e¤ort is
substantially larger than the same probability under low e¤ort. Heterogeneity across couples
is likely to be driven by the size of the outside option (V^ ), as well as the extent of uncertainty
(q; p), labour-leisure preferences that determine the benet functions and heterogeneity in
the costs of e¤ort ( ;	). These are all exogenous to the model.
The rst two cases that we will examine have a slack incentive constraint: they are the
rst best solutions to the problem. The husband denitely invests the high level of e¤ort and
the wife does not need to give him any rent to achieve this. This may be the case if there
is complete information, for example. Under complete information, e¤ort is both observable
and veriable. Alternatively, the husbands cost of e¤ort is not high. As a result, the principal
induces e¤ort subject to a participation constraint only. These two cases can be considered
as benchmark scenarios; they di¤er only in the size of the husbands outside option.
In the rst case, the husbands outside option is low and the participation constraint does
not bind; in the second case, it is high and the participation constraint binds. The reason
why the participation constraint does not always bind is that when the husbands outside
option is low, the wifes individually optimal e¤ort yields the husband a higher utility than
his outside option. As a result, bringing him down to his outside option by reducing her
labour supply would be suboptimal from the wifes perspective.
We denote the rst case, when the participation and incentive constraints do not bind,
as the rst best. Here,  =  = 0: both constraints are slack. The optimality conditions
for the rst best are given below; we have two equations in two unknowns (lG; lB):
@uG
@lG
=
@ G
@lG
; (1)
@uB
@lB
=
@ B
@lB
; (2)
qvG + (1  q)vB > V^   VM + 	H ;
(q   p)(vG   vB) > 	H  	L:
These conditions are intuitive: the wifes marginal utility of additional domestic labour
must equal zero in both states. The husband receives V > V^ . The second case, when the
participation constraint does bind, is the constrained rst best case. In this case,  > 0;
 = 0. The optimality conditions are
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@uG
@lG
  @ 
G
@lG
=  @v
G
@lG
; (3)
@uB
@lB
  @ 
B
@lB
=  @v
B
@lB
; (4)
qvG + (1  q)vB = V^   VM + 	H ; (5)
(q   p)(vG   vB) > 	H  	L:
In each state, the wife equates the di¤erence between her marginal benet and marginal
cost from domestic labour with the husbands marginal benet from her labour, normalised by
the shadow price . Since the latter is always negative, it must be that the wifes marginal
cost exceeds her marginal benet: she works more than she would like to following both
outcomes. The husbands preferences matter: she works proportional to the size of  and to
the husbands benet from her labour. He receives V = V^ .
The other two cases involve an incentive constraint that binds: the wife needs to give
the husband some rent in order to induce a high e¤ort level. They are necessarily second
best because they involve the transfer of rent from wife to husband, which is ine¢ cient. We
denote the third case as the second best with low V^ while the fourth case is the second best
with high V^ .
The second best with low V^ requires  = 0;  > 0. This case implies that while the
wife needs to incentivise the husband to put in high e¤ort, his utility at the high e¤ort level
exceeds his outside option. The rst-order conditions are
q(
@uG
@lG
  @ 
G
@lG
) =  (q   p)@v
G
@lG
; (6)
(1  q)(@u
B
@lB
  @ 
B
@lB
) = (q   p)@v
B
@lB
; (7)
(q   p)(vG   vB) = 	H  	L; (8)
qvG + (1  q)vB > V^   VM + 	H :
The right-hand side of condition (6) is negative; this implies that in the good state,
the wifes marginal cost exceeds her marginal benet: she overworks. In the bad state, her
marginal cost is lower than her marginal benet: she underworks. This is relative to her
individual optimum, where she would set her marginal benet equal to her marginal cost.
The second best with high V^ is arguably the most interesting: it is when both constraints
bind. This requires  > 0 and  > 0. The rst-order conditions are
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q(
@uG
@lG
  @ 
G
@lG
) =  ((q   p) + q)@v
G
@lG
; (9)
(1  q)(@u
B
@lB
  @ 
B
@lB
) = ((q   p)  (1  q))@v
B
@lB
; (10)
qvG + (1  q)vB = V^   VM + 	H ; (11)
(q   p)(vG   vB) = 	H  	L: (12)
Condition (9) implies that at the optimum, the wifes marginal utility in the good state
from domestic labour is negative: she overworks. In contrast, the marginal utility from
domestic labour in the bad state is ambiguous: it can be positive, negative or zero. The
"overwork" in the good state is proportional to q and (q p). The former is the shadow price
on the participation constraint, which is proportional to the husbands outside option. The
latter measures the di¢ culty in incentives;  is the shadow price on the incentive constraint.
The higher are either of these, the more the wife has to overwork. In the bad state, the wife
will work more if the husbands outside option is larger but less if stronger incentives are
needed. Thus, a larger  and q   p increase lG and reduce lB. This is intuitive: the wife has
to reward the husband more in the good state and punish him more severely in the bad state
in order to satisfy the incentive requirements.
When both constraints bind, we have four equations in four unknowns (lG; lB; ; ).
Solving the two constraints for vG and vB tells us that both utilities are proportional to the
outside option and depend on the cost of both e¤orts:
vG = V^   VM + 1  p
q   p	
H   1  q
q   p	
L;
vB = V^   VM   p
q   p	
H +
q
q   p	
L:
Importantly, can we deduce from these equations the relative sizes of lG and lB? The
following lemma shows that under a simple assumption, the wifes domestic labour will be
larger following a good outcome.
Lemma 1 If the consumption good and the public good enter utility independently, lG > lB
when the incentive constraint binds.
Proof. In Appendix B.
We can obtain some idea of the comparative statics of the wifes optimal labour supply
in the second best with high V^ by totally di¤erentiating the two binding constraints with
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Parameter @l
G
@
@lB
@
V^   VM + +
 +  
   +
Table 1: Comparative statics of general solution under the second best
respect to the outside option and other parameters. In particular, we derive the e¤ects of the
di¤erence between 	H and 	L as well as q and p by dening  such that 	H = 	L(1 + )
and  such that q = p(1 + ). The comparative statics are given in Table 1.
These e¤ects are true at the general level whenever we are in the second best with high
V^ . If the mark-up of the high cost of e¤ort over low cost of e¤ort increases, the wifes
labour supply in the good state increases while the labour supply in the bad state decreases.
This increases risk and strengthens the incentives for the husband; this is necessary as he
is more reluctant to invest the high e¤ort. The husbands outside option increases both of
the wifes e¤orts. She has to compensate him more in each state, otherwise he will leave
the marriage. When the di¤erence in the probability of a high outcome under high and low
e¤ort increases, the wife compensates the husband less. This is because the larger di¤erence
between probability of success in the two states helps to generate incentives of its own, so
weaker labour incentives are needed.
3.1.2 The divorce threat mechanism
In this section we consider the optimal labour supplies of the wife when she chooses to
divorce upon observing a bad outcome: U = UD and consequently V  = V D. Similar to the
domestic production mechanism, the solution has four cases, depending on which constraints
bind. Since the labour supplies are not dependent on the continuation payo¤s, the marginal
conditions will be the same for both mechanisms. However, the constraints are di¤erent. As
a result, the solutions will be di¤erent for those cases where at least one constraint binds.
This occurs in all but the rst best. We report only the binding constraints here. In the
constrained rst best, the participation constraint is satised with equality:
qvG + (1  q)vB = V^   qVM   (1  q)V D + 	H :
In the second best with low V^ , the incentive constraint is satised with equality:
(q   p)(vG   vB) = 	H  	L   (q   p)(VM   V D):
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In the second best with high V^ , both constraints bind:
qvG + (1  q)vB = V^   qVM   (1  q)V D + 	H ;
(q   p)(vG   vB) = 	H  	L   (q   p)(VM   V D):
Solving these two constraints for vG and vB gives us
vG = V^   VM + 1  p
q   p	
H   1  q
q   p	
L;
vB = V^   V D   p
q   p	
H +
q
q   p	
L:
Similar to the domestic production mechanism, the husbands utilities in each state de-
pend linearly on the outside option and the costs of e¤ort. The comparative statics of the
second best with high V^ are the same as in the domestic production mechanism, apart from
the fact that VM only a¤ects lG while V D only a¤ects lB. This is because the utility in the
bad state only depends on the continuation payo¤ of divorce, while the utility in the good
state only depends on the continuation payo¤ of marriage.
It may be that divorce threat is a strong enough mechanism such that no labour incentives
are required. As a result, we are in the rst best and both constraints are slack. The wife
sets her marginal benet of labour equal to the marginal cost and divorces the husband if a
low outcome is observed. If Lemma 1 holds, this implies lG = lB. This can occur if VM is
very high and V D and V^ are very low, which implies a situation where the husbands utility
under divorce is much lower than his utility under marriage. In addition, he always prefers
to be married, such that any labour supply exceeds his pre-marital outside option V^ . This
is intuitive: the threat of divorce is enough to make him work hard in marriage, without the
need for the wife to use any domestic production incentives. Such a situation sounds extreme
but it may not be far from the truth of matrilineal marriages. As the anthropological evidence
shows, matrilineal husbands need to work hard or they are quickly replaced. This suggests
that divorce threat may be a strong enough mechanism to induce high e¤ort.
3.1.3 A comparison of the two mechanisms
In the divorce threat mechanism, the wife has to provide less stringent incentives via labour
because threat of divorce acts as an additional incentive device. However, the participation
constraint is more di¢ cult to satisfy because the husbands expected continuation payo¤ is
lower. As a result, when examined purely from the domestic labour perspective, the choice
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of the wife between the divorce threat and domestic production mechanisms is ambiguous.
The most transparent way of seeing this is to compare the two constraints under the two
mechanisms. In the divorce threat mechanism, the constraints are
qvG + (1  q)vB  V^   qVM   (1  q)V D + 	H ;
(q   p)(vG   vB)  	H  	L   (q   p)(VM   V D):
In constrast, in the domestic production mechanism the constraints are
qvG + (1  q)vB  V^   VM + 	H ;
(q   p)(vG   vB)  	H  	L:
The right-hand side of the incentive constraint is smaller under the divorce threat mech-
anism. The incentive constraint is increasing in vG and decreasing in vB. A more lenient
incentive constraint implies a smaller di¤erence between these two, which implies a smaller
di¤erence between lG and lB. With no constraints, the wifes rst best choice is to set
lG = lB. Based on this criterion, the wife prefers the divorce threat mechanism to the
domestic production mechanism.
However, the right-hand side of the participation constraint is larger under the divorce
threat mechanism. The participation constraint is increasing in vG and vB, which are in turn
increasing in lG and lB respectively. Since a more stringent participation constraint implies
higher vG and vB, we conclude that the lG and lB required to satisfy the participation
constraint in the divorce threat mechanism are higher. This makes the wife worse o¤ because
a binding participation constraint implies lG and lB that are larger than her rst best.
In addition to this analysis, we can compare the four solutions. Ceteris paribus, a given
set of parameters would imply that while an incentive constraint may bind under domestic
production, it would not bind under divorce threat. In contrast, a non-binding participation
constraint under domestic production is likely to bind when divorce threat is used. This
implies that we are more likely to have a binding participation constraint under the divorce
threat mechanism, while the incentive constraint is more likely to bind under the domestic
production mechanism. This reinforces the idea that the di¤erence between lG and lB is
likely to be larger under the domestic production mechanism, while the levels of lG and lB
are likely to be larger under the divorce threat mechanism. We make this point more clearly
in Section 3.2.
These comparisons ignore the e¤ect of the continuation payo¤s: although the labour
supplies may be closer to the wifes rst best under the divorce threat mechanism, there is
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the negative e¤ect of the continuation payo¤ under divorce, which is worse than remaining
married. The trade-o¤ between domestic production levels and expected continuation payo¤
determines the optimal choice of U.
3.1.4 The optimal choice of U
Having derived optimality conditions for lG and lB in each case under each mechanism,
we can determine the optimal choice of U, which is e¤ectively an optimal choice between
the two mechanisms. U is chosen by evaluating the wifes expected utility. Assuming all
parameters are constant, she will choose to rely on the divorce threat mechanism rather than
the domestic production mechanism when
UD = q((CG; z(lG;D))  (lG;D) + UM ) + (1  q)((CB; z(lB;D))  (lB;D) + UD)
> q((CG; z(lG;M ))  (lG;M ) + UM ) + (1  q)((CB; z(lB;M ))  (lB) + UM ) = UM
, UD > UM   1
1  q (q(u
G;D   uG;M ) + (1  q)(uB;D   uB;M )); (13)
where UD is her expected utility under the divorce threat mechanism and UM is her ex-
pected utility under the domestic production mechanism. This inequality is clearly increasing
in the continuation payo¤ from divorce: the better is a wifes outside option, the more likely
she is to incentivise via a combination of domestic production and divorce, rather than only
domestic production. This is because in the divorce threat mechanism, there is a positive
probability that she will end up divorced. As a result, her payo¤ in this state must be high
enough. This inequality is also more likely to be satised when the domestic production levels
are more to the liking of the wife in the divorce threat mechanism. However, the relative
sizes of uG;D compared to uG;M and uB;D compared to uB;M are ambiguous.
3.1.5 Commitment
It is important to explain why we expect the wife to commit to any contracted action,
whether it is divorce or a certain labour level. After all, within-marriage contracts are not
binding. After the husband invests high e¤ort and the outcome is realised, the wife has an
incentive to deviate and choose her individually-optimal action. We believe that the repeated
game argument justies the wifes commitment in the domestic production mechanism. In
particular, the game we have analysed above happens repeatedly. In Malawi we believe it
happens every agricultural year, for example. The wife commits to her actions because a loss
of reputation from deviation would be too costly. This is especially the case for women with
low outside options as the expected length of marriage is long. As a result, the benet from
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Case lG lB lM  lD
First best lG;M = lG;D lB;M = lB;D = 0
Constrained rst best lG;M < lG;D lB;M < lB;D = 0
Second best with low V^ lG;M > lG;D lB;M < lB;D > 0
Second best with high V^ lG;M = lG;D lB;M < lB;D > 0
Table 2: A comparison of the wifes labour supplies under the two mechanisms
deviation is likely to be less than its lifetime cost. In the case of commitment to divorce, we
call upon a "more sh in the sea" argument. Upon the realisation of a bad outcome, the
wife interprets this as a signal of the husbands ability. She knows that because her outside
option is high, she can remarry easily. She evaluates that it is better to remarry and take
her chances on a new spouse, rather than remain with her current spouse. This is in line
with the anthropological evidence on Malawi, where remarriage rates are high, especially in
matrilineal areas.
3.2 The Mechanisms with Quasi-Linear Utility
Although testable implications can be drawn from the general case, we present the solution
to the problem when utility is quasi-linear for clarity. In particular, we assume that utility
is linear in the two goods but the cost of e¤ort is convex. The full solution can be found in
Appendix C. We summarise the relationships between labour supplies in the two mechanisms
in Table 2.
The important observation to note from this table is that while the sizes of the labour
supplies vary in both directions across the four cases, the di¤erence between the labour
supplies in the two states in the second best is strictly lower in the divorce threat mechanism
(D) compared to the domestic production mechanism (M).
Using the rst-order conditions and the fact that certain constraints must bind in each
solution, we derive inequalities on the size of each labour supply relative to the rst best,
lFB, as well as the di¤erence between labour supply under the low and high outcomes; they
are shown in Table 3. These hold for both mechanisms. In the constrained rst best, both
labour supplies rise proportionally to the husbands outside option. In the second best with
low V^ , the labour supplies in each state are no longer equal. They are distributed around
the rst best labour supply, with the labour in the bad state lower than the rst best and
the labour in the good state higher than the rst best. The predictions in the second best
with high V^ are less conclusive. It could be that both labour supplies are higher than the
rst best; all we know is that their expected value is higher. This is because of the binding
participation constraint: on average, the husband needs to get more than in the rst best
because his outside option is higher than his utility under the rst best labour supplies.
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Case lG~lFB lB~lFB lG   lB
First best lFB lFB = 0
Constrained rst best > lFB > lFB = 0
Second best with low V^ > lFB < lFB > 0
Second best with high V^ qlG + (1  q)lB > lFB > 0
Table 3: Properties of the wifes optimal labour supply with quasi-linear utility
Finally, we note that just as in the general case, the inequality that determines the optimal
choice of U becomes more likely to be satised as UD increases. The e¤ect of domestic
production levels is ambiguous.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Identication
The question we aim to answer is whether wives use domestic production as an incentive
mechanism. Inequality (13) suggests that wives use this mechanism when their outside op-
tion is low. Otherwise, they rely on divorce threat to induce high e¤ort by the husband. To
represent the wifes outside option, we rely on the distinction between matriliny and patriliny
in Malawi. Evidence suggests that matrilineal wives have higher outside options than patri-
lineal wives. As a result, we expect to observe the use of the domestic production mechanism
in patrilineal marriages and the divorce threat mechanism in matrilineal marriages. We also
examine two related characteristics that are particularly likely to inuence a wifes outside
option: residence upon marriage, which determines asset division on divorce, and whether
the wife has inherited any land from her natal kin. Marital residence and inheritance are
e¤ectively subsets of lineage: within all matrilineal marriages, for example, there are some
that are patrilocal with no inheritance, some that are matrilocal with no inheritance, and so
on. We examine whether marital location or inheritance is a more important determinant of
the use of domestic labour.
We observed that under either mechanism, a binding incentive constraint implies that
lG > lB, as long as Lemma 1 holds. We will assume that this is the case and justify it with
our chosen variables in the next section. The distinction between patriliny and matriliny
implies, from the results of our model, that the di¤erence between lG and lB will be larger
for patrilineal wives.2 This observation gives us two key hypotheses that we will test. First,
that lG > lB for patrilineal wives, and second, that lG   lB is larger for patrilineal than
2 It is reasonable to assume a binding incentive constraint since the anthropological evidence on Malawi
suggests that husbands spend fewer hours working than their wives would like them to. Therefore, we assume
that couples are in the second best. The testable implications of the second best with low V^ and high V^ are
qualitatively the same.
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matrilineal wives. In words, the labour supply response to a change in outcome is nonzero
for patrilineal wives and larger than for matrilineal wives.
We formulate a linear regression equation based on the results of the model with quasi-
linear utility. Although the testable implications of the quasi-linear model are the same
as those of the general model, the quasi-linear model suggests a linear form for the wifes
labour supply. The model is static but hypothesised to repeat several times over the course
of marriage. We carry out a rst-di¤erence analysis over two periods. This allows us to
examine the change in labour in response to a change in outcome, which removes the need
to measure time-invariant factors that a¤ect time use. It also ties in more readily with our
hypotheses. We rely on the size of the wifes consumption good (denoted W ) to identify
the domestic production mechanism. By deriving the change in labour supply (l), we
can derive the direction of the e¤ect of W = Wt   Wt 1. This e¤ect is positive under
the domestic production mechanism and larger than the e¤ect under the divorce threat
mechanism, which may be zero if divorce threat is strong enough. We e¤ectively estimate
two separate regressions for matrilineal and patrilineal couples within the same equation
using interaction dummies. The following equation gives the precise form. We estimate the
regression for patrilineal couples as the baseline case; M is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if the couple is matrilineal3 and zero otherwise. X is a vector of control variables:
l = + MM + W + MM
W + X+ MMX+ ": (14)
The key implications of the model we wish to test are
 > 0; (15)
 + M < : (16)
The rst inequality implies that patrilineal wives respond positively with their domestic
labour to increased spending. The second inequality implies that this e¤ect is smaller for
matrilineal wives than patrilineal wives.
In order to properly identify the divorce threat mechanism, we would need to examine
those couples who divorce in matrilineal marriages. We would expect to observe divorce to
be negatively correlated with W . However, the data does not allow us to do this because
most of the couples who divorce leave the sample and the data does not separate divorce as
a cause of attrition from other factors such as migration and death. As a result, we interpret
the matrilineal marriage as the baseline scenario, with the patrilineal marriage a special case
of that, namely when divorce is not accessible.
3Most of the married couples in our sample are of the same lineage. A small proportion are mixed lineage;
for those, we use the lineage of the wife.
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The variables we use are as follows. For the wifes domestic labour, we use the number
of hours the wife spent on domestic activities (cooking, cleaning and doing laundry) during
the previous regular working day. For W , we use the amount of money spent on the wifes
clothing, fabric for clothing and shoes in the past three months. We use W rather than
the proportion of total clothes spending because evidence suggests that wives do not know
the husbands realised income. As a result, the wife is likely to respond to how much she
receives rather than what proportion of total income she speculates she received. Clothes are
clearly a private, assignable good. Cooking and cleaning almost certainly enter the utility
function separately from clothes spending so that Lemma 1 holds; however, some interaction
may result between laundry and clothes purchases. Robustness regressions (not reported),
however, show that there is no relationship between clothes spending and laundry. As a
result, we keep doing laundry in the domestic labour category.
Possible endogeneity of clothes spending is partly remedied by the rst di¤erence ap-
proach; any omitted variables that might a¤ect clothes spending and domestic labour, such
as bargaining power, are not a problem provided they do not vary across time. Bargaining
power is unlikely to vary in this context because spouses receive land from their families when
they marry and are unlikely to receive any more assets in their lifetimes. Households largely
consume what they earn, being at the subsistence level of consumption, so that we do not
expect any changes in savings, which is typically a source of bargaining power.
The control variables include husbands clothes spending, land, which represents V^ , the
average clothes spending of wives in the village (to control for income-earning opportunities)
and other controls including health, household size and total number of hours reported in
the survey. Note that the cost of e¤ort is an unobservable, omitted variable that a¤ects l.
Since it is an inherent characteristic of the husband, we assume it is uncorrelated with our
explanatory variables.
The husbands outside option is represented by total land owned by the household; how-
ever, this is only accurate for marriages where the husband keeps the land upon divorce,
which is the case in most patrilineal marriages. However, it has been di¢ cult to nd an
appropriate variable for the husbands outside option in a matrilineal marriage, as divorce
only leaves him with his innate ability to earn or re-marry, which is di¢ cult to measure.
Further details of all variables are given in Appendix D.
There may be plausible alternative stories that explain our results; in order to show
their robustness and t with the model, we carry out three alternative robsutness checks:
we examine the impact of clothes spending on leisure and other time use categories, we look
at an alternative measure of cash income (spending on seeds) and we examine respondents
viewpoints on divorce and domestic violence.
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4.2 Data
The data comes from The Malawi Di¤usion and Ideational Change Project, conducted by the
University of Pennsylvania in partnership with the College of Medicine and Kamuzu College
of Nursing in Malawi. The project seeks to examine the role of social interaction under
changing personal conditions, with a focus on HIV/AIDS and family planning. Although not
constructed to represent the national population, characteristics of the sample are close to
those observed in the rural sample of the Malawi Demographic and Health Survey. A roughly
equal number of people were interviewed in the three regions of Rumphi (patrilineal), Balaka
(matrilineal) and Mchinji (patrilineal and matrilineal). The sample consists of ever-married
women between the ages of 15-49 in each district and their husbands. The surveys include
questions on members of the household, economic status, time use and marriage and divorce,
among other topics. We use the 2004 and 2006 survey waves; after reducing the sample to
those households interviewed in both years and with responses to our variables of interest,
we end up with 338 households.
Sample attrition between the two waves does not exhibit strong patterns. When compar-
ing those who leave the sample after 2004 with those who do not, few di¤erences in basic
characteristics are found. Attrition is more likely in southern Balaka compared to northern
Rumphi, which implies that we have more patrilineal, patrilocal and no-inheritance marriages
in our panel. This is not a problem, however, because we estimate separate regressions for
the di¤erent groups.
Those who remain in the sample but report being divorced, separated or having a new
spouse are small in number but similar on basic characteristics. Men who divorce or remarry
tend to be poorer. We do observe di¤erences in lineage and spending among those who
divorce or remarry, however, which lends support to our hypothesis of divorce threat. Divorce
or remarriage are more likely to be observed in matrilineal marriages (71% are matrilineal
as opposed to 63% of those who remain married), matrilocal marriages (65% of divorced
are matrilocal marriages as opposed to 32% of those who are still married) and inheritance
marriages (63% of those divorced have inheritance from their natal kin, as opposed to 41% in
the married sample). These observations lend support to the idea that divorce is signicantly
more common in matrilineal marriages. In addition, clothes and seeds spending are lower on
average in 2004 for those who divorced or remarried after. This provides evidence of poor
marital outcomes being correlated with higher divorce rates.
Once we restrict our sample to those individuals intereviewed in both years, we further
restrict the data to those wives that were interviewed in roughly the same month in both
years, to avoid confounding factors due to the change in labour usage across the agricultural
year. We exclude two groups of marriages: polygamous marriages and marriages where the
husband is not permanently resident in the village. This is because both of these are likely
to have non-standard family interactions.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Some characteristics of our sample are shown in Table 4. We focus on di¤erences across
lineage, as this is an exogenous variable. In terms of basic characteristics, education is higher
in patrilineal marriages, both for wife and husband. This is because the patrilineal north has
a more developed education system, the legacy of Protestant missionaries in colonian times
(Reniers 2003). The regional di¤erences are obvious; while 57% of matrilineal marriages are in
Balaka, only 1% are in Rumphi. Land ownership also exhibits di¤erences we expect: women
own more land in matrilineal than patrilineal marriages, which conrms that their outside
options are higher. In contrast, men own more land in patrilineal marriages. Matrilineal
marriages tend to be poorer on average, with lower average spending for nearly all categories.
This observation is in keeping with the literature, which suggests that matriliny may be to
the detriment of families, where the weak nature of the marriage results in poverty because
husbands, as the primary cash-earners, are not in control of household decisions (Place and
Otsuka 2001).
Patrilocality and inheritance show clear patters by lineage. While 88% of all patrilineal
marriages are patrilocal, only 50% of matrilineal marriages are. This suggests that matrilineal
couples have some exibility in location upon marriage, whereas patrilineal couples do not.
Only 14% of women in patrilineal marriages have inherited land from their natal kin, in
contrast to 61% of women in matrilineal unions. There is a strong correlation between
patriliny, patrilocality and lack of inheritance. This suggests that we will observe similar
results for marriages with these characteristics. Clothes spending increases slightly from
2004 to 2006. marriages.
Next, we analyse the division of labour4 (see Table 5). There are clear di¤erences between
husbands and wives in both years. We conrm that wives specialise in domestic labour: they
spend around 4 hours per day on it while husbands spend around 10 minutes. In contrast,
husbands spend more time on economic labour. The leisure time is about the same on
average. This division of labour is similar across all marriage types, although matrilineal
wives spend more time on economic activities than their patrilineal counterparts.
4.3.2 Regression results
We now turn to the main results of the paper. We regress the change in domestic labour on
the change in clothes spending, initially only using lineage to measure outside option. We
then control for marital residence and inheritance separately to examine the e¤ect of these two
additional channels. One possible alternative explanation of our results is that greater clothes
spending is correlated with being better o¤, which results in a reduced need for farm labour
4See Appendix D for the activities included in each category.
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Matrilineal Patrilineal All
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Age 36:66 44:31 35:59 42:47 36:23 43:57
(10:14) (12:39) (9:75) (11:41) (9:99) (12:02)
Secondary School Educated (%) 0:01 0:09 0:10 0:27 0:04 0:16
(0:07) (0:28) (0:30) (0:44) (0:21) (0:37)
Rumphi (%) 0:01 0:83 0:34
(0:07) (0:38) (0:47)
Mchinji (%) 0:42 0:12 0:30
(0:49) (0:32) (0:46)
Balaka (%) 0:57 0:06 0:36
(0:50) (0:23) (0:48)
Land (acres) 1:71 3:27 0:81 5:49 1:34 4:18
(2:50) (5:39) (1:47) (18:33) (2:18) (12:46)
Poor (2004,%) 0:17 0:09 0:14
(0:38) (0:28) (0:35)
Poor (2006,%) 0:06 0:01 0:04
(0:24) (0:12) (0:20)
Patrilocal (%) 0:50 0:88 0:65
(0:50) (0:33) (0:48)
No inheritance (%) 0:39 0:86 0:58
(0:49) (0:35) (0:49)
Clothes 04 (000 MWK) 0:31 0:91 0:73 1:13 0:48 1:00
(0:56) (5:51) (1:61) (2:32) (1:13) (4:49)
Clothes 06 (000 MWK) 0:80 1:15 0:79 1:07 0:80 1:11
(1:20) (1:55) (1:46) (1:75) (1:31) (1:63)
Seeds 04 (000 MWK) 0:02 0:08 0:05
(0:08) (0:55) (0:36)
Seeds 06 (000 MWK) 0:07 0:11 0:09
(0:34) (0:36) (0:35)
N 200 138 338
Table 4: Sample characteristics by lineage
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Matrilineal Patrilineal All
Women Men Women Men Women Men
2004
Domestic 3:83 0:19 3:93 0:11 3:87 0:16
(1:90) (0:61) (1:63) (0:46) (1:79) (0:55)
Leisure 12:16 13:03 12:08 14:55 12:13 13:65
(3:37) (3:88) (2:77) (3:88) (3:13) (3:95)
Economic 2:46 6:59 1:99 4:62 2:27 5:79
(2:99) (4:35) (2:66) (4:07) (2:86) (4:34)
Other 5:05 3:83 5:78 4:62 5:35 4:15
(2:58) (3:41) (2:88) (3:52) (2:73) (3:47)
2006
Domestic 4:28 0:29 3:48 0:10 3:95 0:21
(1:92) (0:81) (1:77) (0:39) (1:90) (0:68)
Leisure 11:56 12:73 11:04 11:93 11:35 12:40
(2:75) (2:84) (1:95) (2:78) (2:46) (2:84)
Economic 2:67 6:04 3:88 6:54 3:17 6:25
(2:98) (3:87) (3:45) (4:05) (3:23) (3:94)
Other 5:47 4:70 5:07 4:34 5:30 4:55
(2:63) (3:30) (2:90) (3:60) (2:74) (3:43)
N 200 138 338
Table 5: Time use by gender and lineage
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Group5 (1) Domestic (2) Leisure (3) Economic (4) Other
Patrilineal = ^ 0:159  0:292  0:162 0:296
Matrilineal = ^ + ^M 0:053
  0:004 0:081  0:130
Table 6: Total coe¢ cients on clothes spending, controlling for lineage
Group5 (5) Domestic (6) Leisure (7) Economic (8) Other
Patrilineal-Patrilocal 0:195  0:288  0:200 0:292
Matrilineal-Patrilocal 0:090 0:185  0:314 0:038
Matrilineal-Matrilocal 0:007  0:345 0:617  0:278
Patrilineal-Matrilocal  0:910  0:393 0:933 0:370
Table 7: Total coe¢ cients on clothes spending, controlling for lineage and marital residence
and thus an increase in domestic labour. We falsify this hypothesis by regressing leisure and
economic labour on our outcome variables and showing that the increase in domestic labour
in response to more clothes spending comes from leisure, rather than economic labour. Since
leisure is also a good, this indicates a conscious decision to increase domestic production.
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the coe¢ cients on the main wifes clothes spending variable for the
categories of lineage, residence and inheritance. However, full regression results can be found
in Appendix E.
Regression (1) shows the results for domestic labour when we only di¤erentiate by lineage.
We conrm our hypothesis that patrilineal wives use domestic labour as an incentive device:
an additional 1000 MWK ($3:71) spent on their clothing results in about ten more minutes
of housework per day. The hypothesis that matrilineal wives respond less strongly is also
conrmed: their marginal increase per 1000 MWK is only 3 minutes. Regressions (2) and (3)
show that there is a clear substitution for both groups from leisure into domestic production,
with the coe¢ cients on spending similar but of opposite sign for domestic production and
leisure. There is no e¤ect on economic labour and only a slight e¤ect on the Other category
for patrilineal wives. This conrms that what we are observing is an incentive device, rather
than an income e¤ect.
The e¤ect of land is interesting. Land is highly signicant: an increase in total land
owned results in an increase in public labour and a reduction in leisure. This e¤ect is not dif-
ferentiated by lineage. For patrilineal couples, this suggests that an increase in the husbands
outside option reduces a wifes leisure due to her reduced bargaining power. For matrilineal
couples, the e¤ect may be that increased land often implies increased household size, as a
result of which wives may have to spend more time on domestic tasks.
Next, we disaggregate these results by marital residence and inheritance. Regressions
5For those e¤ects involving a sum of the coe¢ cients on several variables, signicance corresponds to an
F-statistic on the joint signicance of all summed coe¢ cients.
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Group5 (9) Domestic (10) Leisure (11) Economic (12) Other
Patrilineal-No inheritance 0:209  0:286  0:214 0:290
Matrilineal-No inheritance 0:104  0:085  0:233 0:214
Matrilineal-Inheritance 0:024 0:037 0:297  0:358
Patrilineal-Inheritance  0:408  0:246 0:398 0:257
Table 8: Total coe¢ cients on clothes spending, controlling for lineage and land inheritance
of wife
(5)-(8) demonstrate the results when we control for marital residence. The marriage types
are ordered in terms of the ability of a woman to divorce: women are least able to di-
vorce in patrilineal-patrilocal marriages and most able to divorce in matrilineal-matrilocal
marriages, with matrilineal-patrilocal marriages falling somewhere inbetween. Patrilineal-
matrilocal marriages are rare and unusual in Malawi; we report the result but do not discuss
it. The results conrm our hypothesis that patrilineal-patrilocal wives respond to spending in
a positive and highly signicant way: for an additional 1000 MWK of spending, they increase
their dometic labour by slightly under 12 minutes. The coe¢ cient is larger than for the whole
group of patrilineal wives in Regression (1), which suggests that patrilocality reduces the ac-
cessibility of divorce for patrilineal wives even further. In contrast, for matrilineal-matrilocal
wives who are the most empowered group with the most accessible divorce, this e¤ect is
almost zero and considerably smaller than the e¤ect for the whole matrilineal category in
Regression (1). The strength of the incentive mechanism for matrilineal-patrilocal marriages
lies between patrilineal-patrilocal and matrilineal-matrilocal marriages. This is in line with
our theory, as this is also the way we would order these marriages in terms of accessibility of
divorce.
Turning to Regressions (6) and (7), we conrm the robustness of our results for patrilineal-
patrilocal and matrilineal-matrilocal wives. For the former, there is a clear substitution from
leisure in domestic production. For the latter, there is a strong negative e¤ect on leisure and
a strong positive e¤ect on economic labour, suggesting the presence of an income rather than
substitution e¤ect: their own spending is highly correlated with their own hours of income-
earning labour. We conclude that patrilineal-patrilocal wives respond more strongly than all
patrilineal wives, while matrilineal-matrilocal wives respond less strongly than all matrilineal
wives. This conrms that patrilocality reduces a wifes outside option and, conversely, that
matrilocality increases it.
We also examine the implications of women owning land that they have inherited from
their natal kin. The reason why this is important is because if divorce were to occur, the
woman would keep this land. This makes divorce more accessible for these women and is
arguably a more important determinant of outside option than marital residence. Table 8
orders the marriages in terms of accessibility of divorce, with divorce being least accessible
to patrilineal-no inheritance wives and most accessible to matrilineal-inheritance wives. The
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results conrm that the extent to which women increase their domestic labour in response to
spending is correlated with the accessibility of divorce. Regression (9) demonstrates a highly
signicant, positive response of domestic labour to spending for patrilineal-no inheritance
wives, who work an additional 12 minutes more per day in the home when they receive an
additional 1000 MWK of clothes spending. This is larger than the e¤ect for all patrilineal
wives in Regression (1) and larger than the e¤ect for patrilineal-patrilocal wives, suggesting
that no inheritance makes divorce even less accessible than patrilocality. The e¤ect for
matrilineal-no inheritance wives is also positive and signicant, although slightly smaller. The
e¤ect for matrilineal-inheritance wives is smaller still. This conrms that land inheritance is
a crucial determinant of a wifes outside option.
The robustness of these results is conrmed by regressions (10) and (11). Again, we ob-
serve a clear substitution from leisure into domestic production for patrilineal-no inheritance
wives. We observe a similar substitution for matrilineal-no inheritance wives, although the
coe¢ cient is not signicant. For matrilineal-inheritance wives, the most empowered group,
the e¤ect is close to zero for all categories.
These results conrm both of the hypotheses of our model: rst, that the domestic pro-
duction mechanism exists, and second, that there is more reliance on it in marriages where
wives have a low outside option. The latter hypothesis is conrmed in a very apparent way,
with highly signicant and positive coe¢ cients on spending for low outside option marriages
and coe¢ cients close to zero or negative for high outside option marriages. A more detailed
analysis of further determinants of a womans outside option demonstrates that land inher-
itance is the crucial factor that increases a womans outside option in Malawi. For women
with no inheritance, the e¤ect of spending on domestic labour is positive and signicant,
regardless of lineage. A slightly smaller e¤ect is observed for patrilineal-patrilocal marriages,
with the smallest but still positive and signicant e¤ect for all patrilineal marriages. The
regressions on other time use categories show a clear substitution away from leisure into
domestic production for women with low outside options.
Our results have several implications. Matriliny and its various components are sources
of empowerment for women. They do not have to rely on ine¢ cient sources of power within
marriage, such as domestic production, to encourage their husbands to work hard. In contrast,
women in non-empowered marriages are not able to divorce if their husband does not provide
them with what they need. Instead, they are faced with little leverage power aside from
their role in the domestic sphere. This echoes what has been heavily discussed in the policy
world, namely that making divorce easy and fair is a key pathway towards improving female
autonomy. However, as we observed in our descriptive statistics, this comes at a price. The
unstable marriages of the south are poorer than the stable marriages of the north, which
has been attributed to the lack of security of husbands in that region as well as the role of
the wife as the decision-maker but not the cash-earner. Therefore, empowerment via divorce
should proceed with caution: women need to be provided with income-earning opportunities
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Group5 (13) Domestic (14) Domestic (15) Domestic
Patrilineal 0:300
Matrilineal  0:230
Patrilineal-Patrilocal 0:293
Matrilineal-Patrilocal  0:170
Matrilineal-Matrilocal  1:552
Patrilineal-Matrilocal 8:393
Patrilineal-No inheritance  1:378
Matrilineal-No inheritance  2:069
Matrilineal-Inheritance 1:535
Patrilineal-Inheritance 0:311
Table 9: Total coe¢ cients on seeds spending, controlling for lineage, marital residence and
land inheritance of wife
in addition to decision-making power, as our data shows that decision-making power when
the husband is the income earner is more likely to result in lower wealth than when the
husband is in charge of both aspects of the household.
4.4 Additional Robustness Analysis
4.4.1 Alternative measure of spending
To provide further support for our model, we use an alternative measure of the size of the
consumption good, namely seeds spending. Table 9 reports the coe¢ cients on the main
spending variable; the full regression results are in Appendix E. They are qualitatively similar
to the results observed for clothes spending. Regression (13) shows the e¤ect of seeds spending
on the domestic labour of patrilineal and matrilineal wives. The e¤ect on patrilineal wives
is statistically signicant and large: an additional 1000 MWK spent on seeds results in 20
minutes of additional domestic labour per day. The e¤ect for matrilineal wives is slightly
negative, again suggesting an income rather than substitution e¤ect. Both coe¢ cients conrm
our two hypotheses: patrilineal wives use domestic production as an incentive device while
matrilineal wives less so. When we control for marital residence in Regression (14), we
observe that the e¤ect is still strong for patrilineal-patrilocal wives. However, the coe¢ cient
is roughly the same as in Regression (13), suggesting that marital residence does not have an
additional e¤ect on outside option and thus domestic labour when we consider farm inputs.
Interestingly, the e¤ect of inheritance in Regression (15) is not signicant. This suggests that
for farm spending, it is lineage and residence of marriage that are the crucial determinants of
the response of domestic labour. A likely reason why the results are not entirely in line with
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Is it acceptable for a woman to leave her husband if he...
Doesnt Provide? Is Violent?
Men Women Men Women
Patrilineal-Patrilocal 22:5% 15:8% 73:3% 81:7%
Matrilineal-Patrilocal 53:5% 48:5% 81:6% 82:8%
Matrilineal-Matrilocal 55:4% 57:0% 82:2% 90:0%
Patrilineal-Matrilocal 29:4% 29:4% 88:2% 88:2%
Answers from 2006 survey. * denotes signicantly di¤erent from
other groups at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.
Table 10: Attitudes to divorce relating to a husbands nancial provision and violence
the previous results is that seeds spending has a production component, which may result in
an additional channel through which spending and labour are linked.
4.4.2 Attitudes to divorce and violence
An examination of attitudes towards divorce can help substantiate some of the assumptions
that drive our results. In particular, we assumed that matrilineal-matrilocal women are more
able to divorce than patrilineal-patrilocal women. This is the reason why the former do not
need to rely on within-marriage sources of power as much as the latter. We can substantiate
this by examining attitudes to divorce in the face of husbands who do not provide nancial
support for women and their children. In particular, husbands and wives were asked whether
it is acceptable for a woman to divorce her husband if he does not provide for her or her
children nancially. The mean values of responses by lineage and marital residence are given
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10. Two observations can be made from this data. First, both
men and women agree that, across the descent groups, there is a varying degree of acceptance
of women divorcing men who do not provide. Second, this justication for divorce is most
acceptable among matrilineal-matrilocal women, is lower for matrilineal-patrilocal women
and is lowest for patrilineal-patrilocal women. This supports the assumption that the threat
of divorce by women is more credible in matrilineal-matrilocal marriages than in patrilineal-
patrilocal marriages.
The second concern that may arise from our assumptions is the possibility of domestic
violence by men as retaliation to women who underprovide domestic labour. This would
be manifested in more accepting attitudes towards violence in marriages where we observe
the use of domestic labour as a source of power. Respondents were asked whether it was
acceptable for a woman to leave her husband if he beats her often. If a woman can leave
her husband in the face of beating, he would be unable to resort to domestic violence to
counteract her use of the domestic labour mechanism. The responses are shown in columns 3
and 4 of Table 10. There are only small di¤erences in attitudes towards violence across descent
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groups. Although patrilineal-patrilocal men have a more accepting attitude towards domestic
violence, this attitude is not shared by their wives, who feel just as able to divorce their violent
husbands as women in other groups. The di¤erence between them and matrilineal-matrilocal
women is only signicant at the 10% level. This indicates that women have similar attitudes
to husbands violence across the descent groups and would respond similarly. Therefore,
it is unlikely that men can counteract the use of the domestic production mechanism with
violence.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to explore how and whether domestic production is
used by wives as a source of power within marriage. We have presented a two-stage, se-
quential moral hazard model of marriage in Malawi where the husband provides a rivalrous
consumption good and the wife provides a public good. The wife may divorce the husband
following a bad level of the consumption good. The existence of divorce threat acts as an
additional source of incentives to encourage the husband to invest high e¤ort. We have shown
that when a wifes utility under divorce is low and she never wants to divorce, the use of
domestic production incentives is more stringent than when divorce is accessible. This has
led us to hypothesise that in Malawi, patrilineal wivesdomestic labour supply exhibits a
positive response to spending on their own clothes and that this response is stronger than
that of matrilineal wives.
By examining the e¤ect of wivesclothes and shoes spending on their domestic time use,
the two hypotheses of our model have been conrmed in all regressions. It has been shown
that wives use domestic labour as an incentive device more stringently in those marriages
where their outside option is low. Patrilineal wives increase their domestic labour by 10
minutes per day when they received an additional 1000MWK on clothes spending. Patrilineal
wives who are also patrilocal exhibit an even stronger e¤ect, with the strongest e¤ect for
patrilineal wives with no land inheritance (12 minutes). The e¤ect is always stronger for
patrilineal compared to matrilineal wives, indicating that matrilineal wives do not need to
incentivise husbands as much. We explain this by the existence of credible divorce threat in
matrilineal communities. The robustness of the results is conrmed by regressions on other
time use variables which show a clear substitution between leisure and domestic production
for patrilineal wives. In addition, we show similar results for an alternative spending category,
seeds. We also show through questions on attitudes to divorce that divorce is more accessible
to women in matrilineal communities and that the acceptability of domestic violence is similar
across descent groups, suggesting that domestic violence is unlikely to be used by patrilineal
men to counteract the domestic production mechanism.
The results imply that when divorce is not accessible, women rely on domestic production
as leverage within marriage. On the other hand, when divorce is accessible, this leverage de-
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vice is less needed. Since using domestic production as leverage results in second best levels of
domestic labour, we conclude that the accessibility of divorce should be encouraged in policy.
By "accessible", we mean both easy but also fair in the sense that the woman is nancially
secure following divorce. However, there is a trade-o¤ to this empowerment. Since the ex-
pected proportion of assets the husband keeps upon divorce falls and the divorce probability
rises, he has reduced incentives to generate household wealth. This may, counterintuitively,
make women worse o¤ on balance.
A General Solution to the Problem
The Lagrange function for the wifes maximisation problem is
L = q((CG; z(lG))  (lG) + UM ) + (1  q)((CB; z(lB))  (lB) + U)
+((q   p)($(CG; z(lG)) + VM  $(CB; z(lB))  V )   (eH) +  (eL))
+(q($(CG; z(lG)) + VM ) + (1  q)($(CB; z(lB)) + V )   (eH)  V^ )
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this program are
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The validity of these rst-order conditions depends on whether they satisfy the conditions
of the Kuhn-Tucker approach. Assuming these conditions are satised, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for a maximum. This implies that as long as we nd
an allocation that satises all of the above conditions, it is the optimal allocation of the
maximisation program. The optimal values of the multipliers are
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For a constraint to bind, the optimal value of the multiplier on that constraint must be
positive at the optimal choice of lG and lB. There are four possible scenarios: where both
constraints bind, where only the participation constraint or incentive constraint binds and
where neither constraint binds. These cases are discussed in the main body of the text.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 states that:
If the consumption good and the public good enter utility independently, lG > lB
when the incentive constraint binds.
Proof. We know that the incentive constraint will bind if the wifes rst best levels of labour
supply lead the incentive constraint not to be satised: $(CG; z(~lG))   $(CB; z(~lB)) <
1
q p(	
H   	L), where (~lG; ~lB) are the rst best labour supply levels. As long as ~lG = ~lB, it
must be the case that lG > lB is required to satisfy the incentive constraint. The wifes
rst best labour supplies solve the following rst-order conditions:
@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=
@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@(CB; z(~lB))
@z(~lB)
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@~lB
=
@(~lB)
@~lB
:
It is clear that ~lG = ~lB as long as @(C
G;z(~lG))
@z(~lG)
= @(C
B ;z(~lB))
@z(~lB)
. This, in turn, will be true
as long as
@(C; z(~l))
@z(~l)@C
= 0:
This will be the case if the consumption good and domestic good enter the wifes utility
independently. Intuitively, this implies that the consumption good should not a¤ect the
productivity of domestic labour or the utility derived from the domestic good. If this is the
case, ~lG = ~lB, which implies that a binding incentive constraint will require lG > lB.
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Note that in the constrained rst best, we require this condition to hold for both the
husband and the wife. The wifes optimality conditions are
@(CG; z(lG))
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:
Here, domestic production in the two states will be equal if the consumption and public
goods are independent in both () and $().
C The Model with Quasi-Linear Utility
The consumption good is shared according to an exogenous sharing rule, such thatW j+Hj =
Cj ; j = G;B;WG > WB; HG > HB, where W j is the amount the wife receives and Hj is
the amount the husband receives. The utilities and costs of e¤ort are
(Cj ; z(lj)) = wW
j + wl
j ;
(lj) =
lj
2
2
;
$(Cj ; z(lj)) = hH
j + hl
j ;
 (ek) =
ek
2
2
:
In the rst best under both mechanisms, the wife sets her marginal benet equal to her
marginal cost:
lG = lB = w:
In the constrained rst best, optimal labour supplies in the domestic production mecha-
nism are
lG;M = lB;M =
1
h
(	H + V^   VM   qhHG   (1  q)hHB);
while the same labour supplies in the divorce threat mechanism are
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lG;D = lB;D =
1
h
(	H + V^   qVM   (1  q)V D   qhHG   (1  q)hHB)
> lG;M = lB;M :
As discussed in the general case, the wifes labour supplies in the constrained rst best of
the divorce threat mechanism are higher because the participation constraint is more di¢ cult
to satisfy. In the second best with low V^ , the labour supplies of the domestic production
mechanism are
lG;M =
1
h
(1 +
h
2
(HB  HG) + 1
2(q   p)(	
H  	L));
lB;M =
1
h
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h
2
(HG  HB)  1
2(q   p)(	
H  	L):
Under the divorce threat mechanism, the labour supplies are
lG;D =
1
h
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h
2
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2(q   p)(	
H  	L)  1
2
(VM   V D)) < lG;M ;
lB;D =
1
h
(1 +
h
2
(HG  HB)  1
2(q   p)(	
H  	L) + 1
2
(VM   V D)) > lB;M :
The di¤erence between the labour supplies is smaller under divorce threat. Last, the
second best case with high V^ has the following optimal labour supplies when the wife uses
the domestic production mechanism:
lG;M =
1
h
(V^   VM   hHG + 1  p
q   p	
H   1  q
q   p	
L);
lB;M =
1
h
(V^   VM   hHB   p
q   p	
H +
q
q   p	
L):
Under divorce threat, the di¤erence between the labour supplies is also smaller:
lG;D =
1
h
(V^   VM   hHG + 1  p
q   p	
H   1  q
q   p	
L) = lG;M ;
lB;D =
1
h
(V^   V D   hHB   p
q   p	
H +
q
q   p	
L) > lB;M :
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D Variables and Data
Variable Data
Domestic Number of hours spent on domestic tasks5during the previous
regular working day
Leisure Number of hours spent on leisure6during the previous
regular working day
Economic Number of hours spent on economic tasks7during the previous
regular working day
Other Number of hours spent on other activities8during the previous
regular working day
Clothes Amount of money self (wife) spent on clothes, fabric for clothes
or shoes in past 3 months
Clothes_villmean The mean of the variable Clothes in the village
Seeds Amount of money household spent on seeds in past 3 months
Land The total amount of land the household owns in acres
Husbclothes Amount of money self (husband) spent on clothes, fabric for clothes
or shoes in past 3 months
Poor Whether the household is poor compared to other households in the
village, according to the interviewer (= 1 if yes, = 0 otherwise)
HHsize The number of regular members of the household
5Cooking, cleaning and washing clothes.
6Sleeping, community and village work, political meetings, religious activities and other leisure activities.
7Field preparation, ridging, planting, transplanting, fertilising, weeding, harvesting, animal care, gathering
vegetables and other operations, wage-labour, group eld labour, salaried employment, sales, handicraft and
alcohol production, transporting goods, metal work, basket weaving, carpentry, charcoal preparation, water
collection for sale and other cash activities.
8School attendance, eating, childcare, visiting friends, collecting water and rewood, repairing the house
and farm, attending funerals, caring for the ill (2006) and sex (2006).
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E Regression Results
All regressions include variables controlling for wifes and husbands illness, as well as the total
number of hours reported. M is a dummy variable for matrilineal, Lm a dummy variable for
matrilocal and Inh a dummy variable indicating the wife has inherited land from her natal
kin.
(1) Domestic (2) Leisure (3) Economic (4) Other
Clothes 0.159 -0.292 -0.162 0.296
(0.065) (0.130) (0.149) (0.170)
Clothes*M -0.105 0.288 0.243 -0.426
(0.154) (0.309) (0.271) (0.297)
M 0.733 -0.255 -1.355 0.877
(0.350) (0.508) (0.621) (0.566)
Husbclothes -0.046 -0.021 -0.060 0.127
(0.075) (0.084) (0.115) (0.139)
Husbclothes*M 0.002 0.104 0.113 -0.218
(0.076) (0.086) (0.117) (0.140)
Clothes_villmean 0.084 -0.018 -0.213 0.148
(0.043) (0.064) (0.107) (0.086)
Clothes_villmean*M 0.434 0.654 -1.087 -0.001
(0.484) (0.788) (0.878) (0.787)
Land 0.008 -0.0300 -0.008 0.030
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Land*M 0.045 -0.011 -0.005 -0.029
(0.029) (0.037) (0.053) (0.048)
Poor -0.472 0.025 -1.529 1.975
(0.520) (0.847) (1.187) (1.178)
Poor*M -0.405 0.482 2.132 -2.210
(0.648) (1.145) (1.373) (1.319)
HHsize -0.159 0.470 -0.142 -0.169
(0.131) (0.158) (0.210) (0.200)
HHsize*M 0.139 -0.382 0.110 0.133
(0.159) (0.231) (0.268) (0.246)
N 338 338 338 338
R2 0.137 0.148 0.085 0.102
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(5) Domestic (6) Leisure (7) Economic (8) Other
Clothes 0.195 -0.288 -0.200 0.292
(0.065) (0.133) (0.156) (0.173)
Clothes*M -0.105 0.473 -0.114 -0.254
(0.179) (0.338) (0.330) (0.347)
Clothes*Lm -1.106 -0.106 1.133 0.078
(0.354) (0.345) (0.780) (0.745)
Clothes*M*Lm 1.022 -0.425 -0.203 -0.394
(0.437) (0.656) (0.855) (0.874)
M 0.770 -0.792 -1.389 1.411
(0.373) (0.533) (0.677) (0.587)
Lm -0.021 1.369 -0.284 -1.065
(0.315) (0.471) (0.548) (0.476)
Husbclothes -0.011 -0.008 -0.098 0.118
(0.074) (0.088) (0.120) (0.150)
Husbclothes*M -0.032 0.087 0.148 -0.202
(0.076) (0.091) (0.122) (0.151)
Clothes_villmean 0.087 -0.003 -0.222 0.138
(0.043) (0.065) (0.108) (0.088)
Clothes_villmean*M 0.398 0.842 -0.843 -0.396
(0.509) (0.767) (0.928) (0.796)
Land 0.010 -0.031 -0.009 0.031
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Land*M 0.041 -0.018 0.017 -0.040
(0.028) (0.043) (0.052) (0.053)
Poor -0.363 -0.132 -1.594 2.089
(0.532) (0.849) (1.230) (1.178)
Poor*M -0.519 0.838 2.180 -2.499
(0.658) (1.150) (1.415) (1.322)
HHsize -0.155 0.461 -0.144 -0.161
(0.132) (0.158) (0.208) (0.205)
HHsize*M 0.129 -0.366 0.169 0.068
(0.163) (0.239) (0.267) (0.255)
N 337 337 337 337
R2 0.147 0.168 0.100 0.118
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(9) Domestic (10) Leisure (11) Economic (12) Other
Clothes 0.209 -0.286 -0.214 0.290
(0.069) (0.142) (0.171) (0.184)
Clothes*M -0.105 0.201 -0.019 -0.077
(0.225) (0.429) (0.399) (0.369)
Clothes*Inh -0.618 0.040 0.612 -0.034
(0.386) (0.422) (0.532) (0.453)
Clothes*M*Inh 0.537 0.082 -0.082 -0.538
(0.450) (0.632) (0.696) (0.632)
M 0.935 -0.687 -1.508 1.260
(0.381) (0.546) (0.746) (0.658)
Inh -0.282 0.732 0.171 -0.621
(0.319) (0.482) (0.601) (0.530)
Husbclothes -0.034 -0.011 -0.074 0.118
(0.073) (0.086) (0.115) (0.142)
Husbclothes*M -0.012 0.098 0.131 -0.217
(0.075) (0.088) (0.117) (0.143)
Clothes_villmean 0.061 -0.016 -0.191 0.146
(0.048) (0.071) (0.115) (0.093)
Clothes_villmean*M 0.365 0.876 -0.973 -0.268
(0.491) (0.795) (0.906) (0.781)
Land 0.009 -0.030 -0.009 0.030
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Land*M 0.044 -0.012 -0.007 -0.026
(0.029) (0.039) (0.058) (0.052)
Poor -0.582 0.119 -1.433 1.895
(0.522) (0.890) (1.187) (1.202)
Poor*M -0.326 0.469 2.061 -2.205
(0.653) (1.175) (1.371) (1.335)
HHsize -0.142 0.489 -0.162 -0.185
(0.129) (0.157) (0.216) (0.206)
HHsize*M 0.116 -0.387 0.141 0.131
(0.158) (0.231) (0.274) (0.254)
N 338 338 338 338
R2 0.145 0.155 0.093 0.115
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(13) Domestic (14) Domestic (15) Domestic
Seeds 0.300 0.293 -1.378
(0.132) (0.132) (3.511)
Seeds*M -0.530 -0.464 -0.690
(0.354) (0.347) (1.723)
Seeds*Lm 8.100
(7.315)
Seeds*Lm*M -9.482
(7.424)
Seeds*Inh 1.689
(3.518)
Seeds*Inh*M 1.914
(3.930)
M 0.821 0.968 0.978
(0.302) (0.332) (0.331)
Lm -0.215
(0.323)
Inh -0.318
(0.311)
Seeds_villmean 0.119 0.115 0.121
(0.051) (0.054) (0.052)
Seeds_villmean*M 0.380 0.382 0.249
(1.251) (1.266) (1.282)
Land 0.009 0.009 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Land*M 0.044 0.046 0.044
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Poor -0.403 -0.399 -0.430
(0.516) (0.519) (0.520)
Poor*M -0.565 -0.580 -0.570
(0.652) (0.660) (0.661)
HHsize -0.144 -0.150 -0.140
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128)
HHsize*M 0.132 0.123 0.118
(0.161) (0.162) (0.162)
N 337 336 337
R2 0.111 0.115 0.11441
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